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ESSAY 
487 
Applying the Safe Distance Rule in 
Counterfeiting Cases: A Call for the Use 
of Broad Equitable Power to Prevent 
Black and Gray Marketeering 
Timothy R. Cahn* 
Joshua R. Floum** 
INTRODUCTION 
Trademark holders are failing to make good use of their full ar-
senal of weapons in the ongoing legal battle against black and gray 
marketeers who deal in counterfeit goods.  The underused weapon 
is the safe distance rule, a broad equitable remedy that allows the 
courts to create a zone of safety around trademark holders victim-
ized by counterfeiting1—a crime that costs intellectual property 
owners billions of dollars.2  By applying the safe distance rule in 
 
* Shareholder, Legal Strategies Group, Emeryville, Cal. Westminster College, 
B.A., summa cum laude, 1980; Harvard Law School, J.D., cum laude, 1990. 
** Shareholder, Legal Strategies Group, Emeryville, Cal.  University of California 
at Berkeley, B.A., with highest honors, 1980; Harvard Law School, J.D., cum laude, 
1983. 
1. The safe distance rule requires courts to draft injunctive relief broadly enough to 
ensure that a past infringer will not have the opportunity to infringe an owner’s rights in 
the future.  See discussion infra Part II (describing the safe distance rule); Sunbeam 
Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the safe 
distance rule gives broad discretion to the courts to ensure that manufacturers do not cir-
cumvent Lanham Act injunctions by making minor modifications to products covered by 
a previous injunction); see also Prince of Peace Enter. Inc. v. Kwok Shing Import-Export, 
Inc., No. 94-04183, 1997 WL 475699, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 1997) (noting that the 
safe distance rule does not apply absent actual infringement). 
2. Trafficking in counterfeit goods is a criminal offense in the United States and 
abroad.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1994) (“Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traf-
fic in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with 
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counterfeiting cases, courts can enjoin counterfeiters from trading 
in any goods of their victims, regardless whether those goods are 
fake or genuine.  By that means, the court can create a zone of 
safety around the victimized trademark holder. 
Nevertheless, counterfeiting victims generally do not seek this 
relief.  Typically, courts merely enjoin the counterfeiter from trad-
ing in non-genuine goods, which is already proscribed by statute.  
Yet the safe distance rule has the power to make a major dent in 
the multi-billion dollar counterfeit industry, which runs the gamut 
from fake branded apparel to shoes to videos to software and 
more.3  Although the United States provides severe civil remedies 
to combat the counterfeiting of intellectual property,4 they are no 
substitute for full application of the safe distance rule. 
Full application of the safe distance rule also would go a long 
way toward solving a related problem: the use of gray market 
goods5 to conceal trafficking in counterfeit goods.  Counterfeiters 
 
such goods or services shall, if an individual, be fined not more than $2,000,000 or im-
prisoned not more than 10 years, or both . . . .”).  Counterfeiting is also a crime under 
state laws.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 350 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
3. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. NO. 2065, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988) 
(estimating the cost to U.S. business from counterfeiting).  More recently, estimates indi-
cate international counterfeiting is increasing at a rate three times the rate of trade in le-
gitimate goods.  See COUNTERFEITING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, INT’L CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, COUNTERING COUNTERFEITING:  A GUIDE TO PROTECTING & ENFORCING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 13 (1997).  Of course, because counterfeiting activity is 
illicit and therefore often hidden, estimates of the scope of this problem are not precise. 
4. Civil remedies in the United States include ex parte civil seizures, treble dam-
ages, statutory damages, and recovery of attorneys fees against parties who engage in 
counterfeiting or who offer to do so.  See Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 
540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & 
Supp. 1998)).  The remedies are found at sections 1116 and 1117.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1116, 
1117 (West 1998).  Section 1116 provides for injunctive relief, id. § 1116; section 1117 
governs other damages.  Id. § 1117; see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 
1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming injunctive relief and award of attorneys’ fees 
against defendant who made a “naked offer” to engage in counterfeiting even though de-
fendant did not complete counterfeit transactions). 
5. This Essay employs the term “gray marketeering” to refer to unauthorized trade 
in genuine goods.  Gray marketeering generally refers to the distribution of genuine 
goods into trade channels or areas that are not authorized by the owner of the intellectual 
property in the goods.  This may occur, for example, when a “foreign-manufactured 
good, bearing a valid United States trademark . . . is imported without the consent of the 
United States trademark holder.”  K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 
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oftentimes deal simultaneously in black market goods and in genu-
ine, gray market goods6—at times using them to provide cover for 
their counterfeiting.  Counterfeiters often mix genuine, gray market 
goods and fake products into a single shipment.  Such a mixture of 
phony and genuine goods within a single order thwarts efforts to 
detect or interdict counterfeit goods, because customs officials or-
dinarily lack the resources to inspect every article in a large ship-
ment.  Thus, black and gray marketeering often go hand-in-hand.  
 
(1988). 
Unauthorized distribution of genuine goods also is referred to as the parallel or sec-
ondary market, and is also described as product diversion: 
[Gray marketeers] always purchase the goods from the manufacturer and owner 
of the trademark or an intermediary, and resell the goods in violation of an 
agreement the manufacturer has with the exclusive distributor, or a policy of 
the manufacturer barring the sale of the goods in a particular geographic mar-
ket. 
Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 
1303 (5th Cir. 1997). 
Although gray market activity generally does not violate United States trademark 
laws—at least when the gray marketed goods are not materially different from goods the 
intellectual property owner has authorized for sale—it disrupts an intellectual property 
owner’s distribution system.  Gray marketeering damages an intellectual property 
holder’s relationships with distributors, undermines its marketing premises and efforts, 
and robs it of differential profit margins available by virtue of the higher demand and 
otherwise restricted supply in regional markets. 
Gray marketeers make substantial profits by taking advantage of the differential 
price structures of global companies throughout the world.  For example, gray marketeers 
may accumulate goods bought in the United States and resell them overseas, outside the 
manufacturer’s authorized foreign distribution channels.  The market dynamics, alterna-
tively, can work in reverse, allowing gray marketeers to undercut authorized domestic 
United States sales by importing and selling identical goods procured more cheaply 
abroad.  The Lanham Act prohibits certain gray market practices, such as unauthorized 
trade in goods that are materially different from their authorized counterparts.  15 
U.S.C.A. § 1114; see Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elec., Inc., 816 
F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the unauthorized importation of dolls, manufactured 
for sale in Spain, into the United States could be enjoined under the Lanham Act because 
the Spanish-made dolls were materially different from those authorized for sale in the 
United States). 
6. In a recently filed case, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Benjy West, Levi Strauss alleged 
that the defendants, gray marketeers, mixed genuine and phony goods to further their 
counterfeiting activities.  Defendants brought a motion to dismiss these claims, but the 
district court denied the motion, holding “Defendants are not merely reselling the genuine 
products; rather Defendants are allegedly wrongly acquiring them in order to facilitate 
their counterfeiting activities.”  Levi Strauss & Co. v. Benjy West, No. 97-7287-WJR 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1997) (denying motion to dismiss). 
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The safe distance rule allows the courts to deal with such use of le-
gal conduct to mask illicit activity.  Under newly developing au-
thorities, United States intellectual property rightholders have been 
able to restrain counterfeiting defendants’ trade in gray market 
products.7 
This Essay suggests that intellectual property owners should 
consider carefully the application of judicial injunctive powers to 
prevent both black and gray marketeering.  Part I discusses the eq-
uitable remedies law that authorizes courts to include, within in-
junctive relief, provisions enjoining even arguably legal conduct.  
Part II explores the application of general equitable principles to 
trademark infringement cases and the judicially created safe dis-
tance rule.  Part III extends the analysis to counterfeiting and ar-
gues that courts should enjoin counterfeiters from trading in genu-
ine, gray market goods of intellectual property owners.  This Essay 
concludes that courts should utilize their broad equitable powers to 
discourage black marketeering and the unauthorized distribution of 
gray market goods. 
I. COURTS’ EQUITABLE POWERS TO ENJOIN LAWFUL CONDUCT 
Courts command broad equitable powers to enjoin lawful, even 
protected, conduct when the remedy is fairly tailored to vindicate a 
statutory right or interest created by Congress, such as the fair and 
free competition interests embodied in the federal antitrust laws or 
the rights protected by the civil rights statutes.  Those equitable 
principles have found special application in the trademark arena 
through adoption of what is known as the safe distance rule, requir-
ing courts to draft injunctive relief broadly enough to ensure that a 
past infringer will not have the opportunity to infringe an owner’s 
rights in the future.8 
 
7. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982 (11th Cir. 
1995) (affirming district court’s enjoining of a counterfeiter’s trade in genuine Levi’s 
brand apparel). 
8. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 260-61 (5th Cir. 
1997) (noting that the safe distance rule gives broad discretion to the courts to ensure that 
manufacturers do not circumvent Lanham Act injunctions by making minor modifica-
tions to products covered by a previous injunction); see also Prince of Peace Enter. Inc. v. 
Kwok Shing Import-Export, Inc., No. 94-04183, 1997 WL 475699, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 
8, 1997) (noting that the safe distance rule does not apply absent actual infringement); 
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The equitable powers of courts to fashion appropriate injunc-
tions enjoy an unassailable pedigree.  In the civil rights context, the 
Supreme Court held that, “[o]nce invoked, ‘the scope of a district 
court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for 
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.’”9  
Therefore, when the right to be remedied is derived from the Con-
stitution or a statute, as in the case of the Lanham Act10 or the 
Copyright Act,11 the courts’ power to fashion a remedy exceeds the 
narrow scope of the right.12 
This distinction between a statutory right and the equitable re-
lief necessary to protect the right is critical.  Indeed, courts are re-
quired to employ their broad equitable powers to enforce such 
rights, including imposing relief that restrains acts that are not 
themselves wrongs, unless the statute expressly limits those equi-
table powers.13  For example, in a price-fixing case under the 
 
discussion infra Part II (describing the safe distance rule). 
9. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)) (affirming a court’s power, once a 
constitutional right has been violated, to implement broad remedies to vindicate such 
right).  In Hutto, plaintiffs, who were prisoners within the Arkansas prison system, 
brought suit charging that prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment.  The Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s imposition 
of a 30 day limit on punitive, solitary confinement.  The Court stated that, given the 
prison officials’ repeated failure to cure constitutional violations, this broadly worded 
“comprehensive order [was justified] to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance” 
with constitutional requirements.  Id. at 687. 
10. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
11. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010(1994)). 
12. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 1. 
13. Cf. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 464 
(1986) (Brennan, J., plurality) (ruling that the specific language of title VII remedies pro-
vision did not preclude a court order of preferential relief benefiting individuals not ac-
tual victims of discrimination).  Far from limiting a court’s broad powers, the Lanham 
Act provides that courts can grant injunctions “according to the principles of equity.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1116(a) (West 1994).  One authority explained: 
If remedies should enforce rights, then the tailoring stage should shape the 
remedy to reflect the rights in question, subject only to practical constraints.  
Because injunctions can provide many different means and terms, they may at 
times be tailored to forbid acts that are not themselves wrongs, or to command 
acts that are not in themselves part of the plaintiff’s entitlement. 
1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 114 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). 
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Sherman Act,14 the Supreme Court stated that “relief, to be effec-
tive, must go beyond the narrow limits of the proven violation.”15  
Thus, “[a]cts entirely proper when viewed alone may be prohib-
ited.”16 
Accordingly, a court’s broad equitable powers to secure rights 
created by statute may include the enjoining of conduct otherwise 
lawful under the statute when the injunction is tailored to vindicate 
the statutory rights.  To this end, an injunction may restrain even 
constitutionally protected conduct.17  In ES Development, Inc. v. 
RWM Enterprises, Inc.,18 the Eighth Circuit upheld an injunction 
barring defendant automobile dealers from communicating with 
their manufacturers even though such communications constituted 
commercial speech protected under the First Amendment.19  The 
RWM Enterprises court declared that courts are “empowered to 
fashion appropriate restraints on [the defendant’s] future activities 
both to avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its con-
sequences.”20  The court added that, in fashioning a remedy, a dis-
trict court should endeavor to prevent “conspirators” from receiv-
ing “future benefits from their forbidden conduct.”21  Thus, 
according to the court, “the district court may consider both the 
‘continuing effects of past illegal conduct,’ and the possibility of 
‘lingering efforts’ by the conspirators to capitalize on the benefits 
of their past illegal conduct.”22 
The courts have applied their broad equitable powers to enjoin 
otherwise legal conduct in a number of areas.  For example, in one 
antitrust case the court compelled a watch manufacturer, found to 
have fixed prices with its exclusive distributors, to sell its watches 
 
14. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 105-165, approved Mar. 20, 
1998)). 
15. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 90 (1950). 
16. Id. at 89 (citation omitted). 
17. See ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1097 (1992). 
18. Id. 
19. See id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. (citations omitted). 
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to another distributor—even though the manufacturer normally 
would have a broad right to choose distributors.23 
In the employment context, courts can impose injunctions that 
go beyond proscribing wrongful acts, even if the order infringes on 
an employee’s liberties in the workplace.  In FMC Corp. v. Varco 
International, Inc.,24 the Fifth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunc-
tion drafted to protect plaintiff’s trade secrets against disclosure by 
a former employee.  The court’s order went beyond merely forbid-
ding disclosure of the secrets and enjoined the defendant business 
from putting the employee in any position that would pose a threat 
of inadvertent trade secret disclosure.25  Courts also have enjoined 
otherwise legal action as a remedy in civil rights cases,26 employ-
ment contract cases,27 and harassment cases.28 
Nowhere, however, are courts’ equitable powers to enforce 
statutory rights more apparent than when protecting the intellectual 
property rights recognized by the trademark and copyright statutes.  
The Lanham Act expressly authorizes district courts to “grant in-
junctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such 
terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of 
any right of the registrant of a mark . . . .”29  Likewise, the Copy-
right Act authorizes “injunctions on such terms as [the court] may 
deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copy-
right.”30  With these terms, Congress plainly expressed its intention 
that district courts have wide discretion to fashion the terms of an 
 
23. See Trabert & Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp., 633 F.2d 477, 485 (7th Cir. 
1980).  “The issuance of an injunction against future refusals to deal with the injured 
company has been repeatedly upheld where necessary to cure past and to prevent future 
Sherman Act violations.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Such a remedy is especially appropri-
ate, the court observed, if “the defendants cannot be trusted . . . .”  Id. at 486. 
24. 677 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1982). 
25. See id. at 505. 
26. See English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319, 324 (2nd Cir. 1971) (“[A] 
court could prohibit otherwise lawful acts until the condition had been rectified.”). 
27. See Savoy Record Co., Inc. v. Mercury Record Corp., 108 F. Supp 957 (D.N.J. 
1952). 
28. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998 (2nd Cir. 1973) (holding a photogra-
pher who had harassed a celebrity is properly enjoined from coming within 25 feet of 
her). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1994). 
30. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994). 
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injunction to protect the rights created by these statutes.  Thus, so 
long as the district court deems the terms of an injunction reasona-
bly necessary to prevent violation of a right, and the terms do not 
violate principles of equity, the injunction should not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAFE DISTANCE RULE IN TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT CASES 
Consistent with the principles of equity, courts often have used 
their broad equitable powers in the area of trademark infringement 
and unfair competition to enjoin conduct that otherwise would not 
violate the Lanham Act or state law.  In fact, the courts have de-
veloped a specially named rule, the safe distance rule, which states 
that “[a] competitive business, once convicted of unfair competi-
tion in a given particular, should thereafter be required to keep a 
safe distance from the margin line—even if that requirement in-
volves a handicap as compared with those who have not disquali-
fied themselves.”31 
As articulated by various courts, the safe distance rule of equity 
serves several complementary purposes.  It ensures that injunctive 
relief will be broad enough to protect the plaintiff-owner from fu-
ture recurrent infringing conduct by the defendant.  It also facili-
tates monitoring of the defendant’s compliance with a court’s in-
junction by delineating clear limitations on defendant’s conduct.  
This rule further relieves the court from having to adjudicate the 
issue of infringement anew each time the defendant makes minor 
changes to the design of its products.  The safe distance rule also is 
meant to ensure that the defendant does not retain any lingering 
benefit or goodwill from its past infringing activities.  And, finally, 
in the case of an egregious or intentional infringer, the safe dis-
tance rule serves the punitive purposes of the Lanham Act by pre-
venting the defendant from engaging in conduct, which would be 
lawful for defendant’s competitors. 
 
31. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1547 n.88 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. v. Manoff, 41 F.2d 353, 354 (6th Cir. 1930)); see also 5 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:4 (4th 
ed. 1997). 
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The safe distance rule has been applied most commonly in 
cases where a defendant-infringer has been ordered to make 
changes in the design or packaging of its infringing products.  In 
one typical case, Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,32 the Eleventh Circuit 
held that a party liable for trade dress infringement under the Lan-
ham Act was properly enjoined from using even those parts of the 
plaintiff’s trade dress that did not constitute infringement.33 
The Ambrit case arose out of a dispute over the packaging of 
chocolate ice cream bars.  The plaintiff, Ambrit, Inc. (“Ambrit”), 
successfully sued defendant, Kraft, Inc. (“Kraft”), on the grounds 
that the wrapper of Kraft’s Polar B’ar infringed the trade dress of 
Ambrit’s Klondike bars.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court injunction, forbidding Kraft from using any image of a polar 
bear on its chocolate ice cream bar wrapper.34  According to the 
Eleventh Circuit, included within a court’s equity power to “fash-
ion appropriate relief” is the authority to proscribe more than “the 
use of a ‘confusingly similar mark.’”35  Therefore, the Eleventh 
Circuit added, “[i]n fashioning relief against a party who has trans-
gressed the governing legal standards, a court of equity is free to 
proscribe activities that, standing alone, would have been unassail-
able.”36 
The desire to ensure effective relief against a repeat infringer 
motivated the Second Circuit’s invocation of the safe distance rule 
in Oral-B Laboratories, Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp.37  In that case, the 
plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction against defendant Mi-
Lor Corporation’s (“Mi-Lor”) toothbrush packaging on the 
grounds that the packaging infringed Oral-B Laboratories’ (“Oral-
B”) trademarks and other rights.  After the initial injunction pro-
hibited Mi-Lor from using toothbrush boxes with a blue and white 
 
32. 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986). 
33. See id. at 1547-48. 
34. See id. at 1551. 
35. Id. at 1547 n.86 (citations omitted). 
36. Id. at 1548 (quoting Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging 
Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 390 (5th Cir. 1977)).  The Ambrit court also held that one portion of 
the district court’s order went too far:  the injunction against any use by Kraft of the 
“royal blue” color on a foil wrapper.  Id. at 1548-49.  The court remanded for a more nar-
rowly tailored portion of the order addressing the color of the wrapper. 
37. 810 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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oval, Mi-Lor redesigned its boxes.  After each redesign, however, 
the district court found the boxes still infringed Oral-B’s rights.  
The court eventually cited Mi-Lor for contempt of its order and en-
tered a broadly worded order which, among other things, prohib-
ited Mi-Lor from making any references whatsoever on its boxes 
to “Oral-B,” including references for comparative advertising pur-
poses that ordinarily would be legal and protected under the First 
Amendment.38  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s use 
of its discretion by finding that such a broad provision would “as-
sure that future toothbrush boxes would not be confusingly similar 
to Oral-B’s.”39 
Assuring the plaintiff adequate protection against numerous 
and distinct infringements was a paramount concern of the Fifth 
Circuit in Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc.40  In Conan 
Properties, the owner of the rights in the fictional character Conan 
the Barbarian sued a pizza restaurant chain for trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition.  The jury found for the plain-
tiff, but the court denied it any monetary or injunctive relief be-
cause of plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit.  The appeals court 
reversed the denial of injunctive relief and remanded for an order 
prohibiting the  defendant from using in its restaurants anything re-
sembling or derived from the Conan the Barbarian.41  The court 
held that such a broad injunction was needed to ensure that the de-
fendant would not simply “modify his behavior ever so slightly 
and attempt to skirt the line of permissible conduct.”42 
The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar rationale to keep an in-
fringer at a safe distance in the more recent case of Sunbeam Prod-
 
38. Id. at 24. 
39. Id.  Further, the court distinguished another case that had denied such relief on 
the grounds that the other case “had not considered the injunction on comparative adver-
tising necessary for effective relief.”  Id. at 25.  The Second Circuit also was swayed by 
the punitive purposes served by the safe distance rule as applied against a guilty infringer.  
The court stated:  “Furthermore, a party who has once infringed a trademark may be re-
quired to suffer a position less advantageous than that of an innocent party.”  Id. at 24 
(citing Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 154 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
40. 752 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1985). 
41. See id. at 154. 
42. Id. 
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ucts, Inc. v. West Bend Co.43  Plaintiff Sunbeam Products Inc. 
(“Sunbeam”) obtained a preliminary injunction against the defen-
dant for infringing Sunbeam’s trade dress and other intellectual 
property rights relating to a mixer.  The injunction was extended to 
defendant’s modifications of the mixer that, by themselves, may 
not have been infringing.  Without even considering whether or not 
the new designs were infringements, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
broad injunction after applying the safe distance rule, thereby as-
suring that Sunbeam’s rights could not be circumvented piecemeal 
by subsequent minor changes to new products.44  The Fifth Circuit 
stated that this rule “vests broad discretion in the district court” to 
“issue injunctions that sweep even more broadly than the Lanham 
Act would permit against a manufacturer who has not already been 
found liable for trademark infringement.”45 
Punishing prior infringement and ensuring effective future re-
lief were the primary reasons for the broad application of the safe 
distance rule in Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified 
Packaging Corp.46  Plaintiff Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation 
(“KFC”) sued Diversified Packaging Corporation (“Diversified”) 
for manufacturing and selling food containers and napkins bearing 
KFC’s trademarks to KFC’s franchisees without authorization 
from KFC.  Diversified also misled KFC’s franchisees by failing to 
inform them that they were not authorized suppliers of KFC 
branded sundries.47  In addition to proscribing Diversified’s spe-
cific acts of unfair competition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial 
court’s injunction, forbidding use of marks that Diversified might 
otherwise have been entitled to use.  The court stated that Diversi-
fied’s “conduct clearly calls for strong and effective relief”48 and 
that the broad injunction was “justified by [Diversified’s] history 
of improper behavior.”49 
Many other trademark and trade dress cases have applied the 
 
43. 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997). 
44. Id. at 260-261. 
45. Id. 
46. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977). 
47. Id. at 372. 
48. Id. at 390 n.28. 
49. Id. at 390. 
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safe distance rule and recognized the power of courts to enjoin in-
fringers from engaging in conduct that ordinarily would not be in-
fringing or otherwise unlawful.50  In addition, some courts have 
applied the safe distance rule as a standard by which defendants’ 
compliance with the terms of an existing injunction is to be strictly 
judged.  Such courts hold that defendants may not escape liability 
for contempt of an injunction by adhering to the letter of an injunc-
tion while skirting the court’s intent.51  Thus, the safe distance rule 
is both a principle useful in drafting terms of an injunction and a 
justification for enforcing strict compliance with those terms.52 
III. COURTS SHOULD ENJOIN COUNTERFEITERS FROM ENGAGING IN 
THE GRAY MARKET 
Courts should enjoin counterfeiters from engaging in gray 
market trade.  This is particularly true in light of the safe distance 
rule and the interrelationship between counterfeiting and gray mar-
keteering.  First, broadly worded bright line injunctions are the 
most, and in many cases the only effective way to guard against 
recurrent counterfeiting.  Second, injunctions that merely prohibit 
defendants from future acts of counterfeiting are, for all practical 
purposes meaningless without additional protection for the plain-
tiff-owner.  Third, enjoining the otherwise lawful trade in genuine 
 
50. See, e.g., OSEM Food Indus. Ltd. v. Sherwood Foods, Inc., 917 F.2d 161, 164 
n.4 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, relying in 
part on the safe distance rule); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 
659 F.2d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 1981) (extending injuction to include similar but non-
infringing packaging when one of defendants packages violated plaintiff’s trade dress); 
Plough, Inc. v. Kreis Lab., 314 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1963) (observing the rule that, 
once caught, an infringer is required to keep a safe distance away from the margin line); 
Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 F. 720, 724-25 (6th Cir. 1912) (barring manufacturer 
of a cola whose color resembled Coca Cola from using that color even if defendant did 
not intend to mislead consumers); Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Seidenburg, 619 F. Supp. 
1173, 1185 (W.D. La. 1985) (applying safe distance rule at preliminary injunction stage 
to justify entering broad order requested by plaintiff). 
51. See Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 
1990); Wella Corp. v. Wella Graphics, Inc. 37 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying safe 
distance rule to hold defendant strictly responsible for compliance with intent of injunc-
tion). 
52. See Oral-B Laboratories, Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp., 810 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(applying the safe distance rule both as a rule of drafting and of measuring compliance 
with injunctions). 
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goods ensures that willful counterfeiters will be deprived of any 
lingering economic benefit from their past illicit conduct.  And, fi-
nally, such injunctions serve the important punitive purposes of 
United States anti-counterfeiting laws. 
Courts should apply the safe distance rule to counterfeiting 
cases.  As a result, courts would order counterfeiting defendants 
not to infringe upon plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights through 
gray marketing or counterfeiting.  Under the principles of equity 
invoked by the remedy sections of our civil counterfeiting laws, 
the scope of an injunction should address more than past methods 
or violations; it also should foreclose the possibility that future vio-
lations will occur.53  Further, in counterfeiting cases, any doubt 
about whether a given injunction is broad enough to provide effec-
tive relief “must be resolved in [the owner’s] favor . . . and against 
the [defendant], which has shown by its conduct that it is not to be 
trusted.”54 
Often, the only effective way to ensure that a counterfeiter will 
refrain from selling counterfeit goods in the future is to prohibit the 
defendant from dealing in the plaintiff’s branded or copyrighted 
goods altogether.  A proven counterfeiter who is free to continue 
dealing in the plaintiff’s goods has many ways to conceal its con-
tinued illegal conduct.  The counterfeiter may, for example, cam-
ouflage its counterfeiting operations with the occasional trade in 
genuine goods or by combining into one shipment both genuine 
and counterfeit goods.  Furthermore, a counterfeiter’s continued 
participation in the channels of trade through which gray market 
goods move may afford the counterfeiter the opportunity to move 
 
53. See Field Enters. Educ. Corp. v. Cove Indus., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 989, 998 
(E.D.N.Y. 1969) (“In any equity case once danger is revealed, the power to protect 
against foreseeable abuse is broad.”); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 
F.2d 145, 154 (5th Cir. 1985) (protecting against recurrent violations “by issuing broad 
injunctions that prohibit conduct that clearly infringes the plaintiff’s mark as well as con-
duct that ordinarily would not justify any relief.”); cf. United States v. American Tel. and 
Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 150 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (applying 
injunctive relief to effectively foreclose recurring antitrust violations). 
54. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 
1151 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132, 
1135 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 
532, 44 (1924))). 
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counterfeit goods through those same channels, thereby making the 
counterfeit transactions difficult to detect.  A bright line injunction 
forbidding any trade in the plaintiff’s branded goods can provide 
the plaintiff and the court with a straightforward means of ensuring 
compliance with the injunction and is the only reliable assurance 
against recurrent counterfeiting. 
The alternative—an injunction that enjoins the defendant from 
engaging only in future counterfeiting—forbids conduct already 
prohibited by existing criminal and civil laws.55  Thus, a civil order 
prohibiting continued future counterfeiting provides the plaintiff 
with little or no additional protection than those laws guarantee. 
Existing civil laws entitle plaintiff-owners to seek contempt 
sanctions against recurrent counterfeiters, but only upon a showing 
of clear and convincing evidence: a standard much more stringent 
than that required to establish civil liability under the counterfeit-
ing statute.56  Moreover, a persistent counterfeiter, who has shown 
that it is not deterred by the steep monetary sanctions already 
available in the civil counterfeiting provisions,57 is unlikely to be 
deterred by the piling on of additional monetary sanctions for civil 
contempt.  In short, an injunction that merely tells the counterfeiter 
not to counterfeit again, is a meaningless added protection. 
Preventing a counterfeiter from dealing in the genuine goods of 
the plaintiff serves another important principle of equity: it ensures 
that the defendant retains no enduring benefit from its illicit activi-
ties.  Courts commonly recognize that injunctions against future 
lawful conduct may be necessary to negate the benefit received 
 
55. See Majestic Drug Co., Inc. v. Olla Beauty Supply, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 0046, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 900, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1997) (“An injunction which merely 
forbids a defendant . . . from ‘infringing on plaintiff’s trademarks and trade secrets’ adds 
nothing to what the law already requires.” (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:8 (2d ed. 1984))).  Courts frown upon 
injunctions that, by their terms, merely prohibit the defendant from repeat violations of 
the law, as failing to satisfy the requirement, in rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, that injunctions “shall be specific in terms [and] shall describe in reasonable de-
tail . . . the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . .”  Id. at *37 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
65(d)). 
56. See Oral-B, 810 F.2d at 24. 
57. The civil counterfeiting law provides statutory damages of as much as $1 mil-
lion per trademark for willful counterfeiting. 
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from a defendant’s past unlawful conduct as well as to eradicate ill 
effects of continued conduct.58  In the course of infiltrating the 
market with  counterfeit products, counterfeiters often forge rela-
tionships with the plaintiff’s customers by falsely representing to 
buyers and intermediaries that they are a source of genuine prod-
ucts.  It would be inequitable to allow counterfeiters to take advan-
tage of goodwill fostered in the course of their fraud. 
Broad injunctive relief which disqualifies counterfeiters from 
participation in otherwise legitimate trade is also a just punishment 
for willful wrongdoers.  Public policy commands that a counter-
feiter who intentionally pirates another’s trademark must not be 
permitted to make profits off those marks in the future.  By prohib-
iting counterfeiters from participating in the gray market trade, 
courts serve the important punitive and compensatory objectives 
that the anti-counterfeiting laws espouse. 
Public policy, civil and criminal laws, and practical considera-
tions should encourage district courts to assert their equitable pow-
ers to enjoin a counterfeiter’s trade in genuine goods when the 
situation so demands.  The district court for the Southern District 
of Florida demonstrated the appropriateness of full injunctive relief 
in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise International Trading, Inc.59  That 
case arose from allegations by Levi Strauss & Company (“Levi 
Strauss”) that a number of manufacturers were involved in a major 
international scheme to counterfeit LEVI’S jeans.  According to 
the complaint, the defendants manufactured counterfeit LEVI’S 
jeans abroad and sold them at substantial profit to various retailers 
throughout Europe.60  The district court, which had previously en-
 
58. See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 
695, 705-06 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding injunction should be broad enough to inhibit efforts 
“by [defendants] to retain . . . part of the good will originally misappropriated from 
[plaintiffs]”); see also ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 557 (8th Cir. 
1991) (restricting defendants’ contacts with their antitrust conspirators because otherwise 
they “could continue to reap the benefits of their past illegal conduct”); Broderick & Bas-
com Rope Co. v. Manoff, 41 F.2d 353, 354 (6th Cir. 1930) (finding that permitting de-
fendants to compete equally as an “honest competitor” would “preserve for them a good 
will acquired through fraud”). 
59. 51 F.3d 982, 982-85 (11th Cir. 1995). 
60. See id. at 984 (affirming preliminary injunction order that, among other things, 
prevented defendants from “participating in transactions involving any genuine or coun-
terfeit LS & CO product”). 
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tered a preliminary injunction against the defendants,61 found that 
Levi Strauss was entitled to a permanent injunction in order to 
“protect it from recurrent counterfeiting or infringing activities by 
defendants.”62  Accordingly, the district court entered a broad in-
junction forbidding defendants from dealing in any goods bearing 
plaintiff’s trademarks, without regard to their genuiness. 
CONCLUSION 
The appropriate invocation of the courts’ equitable power in 
counterfeiting cases can pay high dividends for intellectual prop-
erty owners.  One can imagine the application of the safe distance 
rule, for example, to enjoin flea market proprietors—once caught 
selling counterfeit cassettes, compact discs, or videos—from sell-
ing similar products, real or genuine.  Or, in the case of manufac-
turers and traders in counterfeit cable box descramblers, an order 
preventing such defendants from tampering with, or even servic-
ing, genuine boxes.  Of course, the most analogous application of 
the safe distance rule would prevent traders in counterfeit products, 
such as branded apparel, copyrighted software, and Internet-based 
products, from trading in genuine or similar versions of the pirated 
products.  The peril to those defendants should be much greater 
than the mere disqualification of their counterfeit trade.  Rather, 
those pirates should face banishment from trading in the victim’s 
goods at all. 
In an era when legislatures are providing greater protection for 
the rights of intellectual property holders, the courts should seek 
out and re-analyze the methods it employs to enforce existing laws.  
Courts should be encouraged to fashion creative and stern equita-
ble remedies that will raise the stakes and provide strong disincen-
tives for those who would trade in counterfeit products.  In sum, 
 
61. Defendants appealed the entry of the preliminary injunction and the imposition 
of an asset freeze.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  See id. at 987.  The circuit court, how-
ever, did not address the merits of the district court’s injunction against the sale of genu-
ine goods by the defendant in the preliminary injunction because the issue had not been 
preserved.  See id. at 986.  Defendants did not appeal the entry of the permanent injunc-
tion. 
62. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., No. 93-6547 (S.D. Fla. 
July 16, 1993). 
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courts should assert their equitable jurisdiction to bar a counter-
feiter, once caught, from engaging in otherwise lawful gray market 
trade in branded goods of the plaintiff. 
 
